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IT'S A QUESTION OF MARKET ACCESS
By Kyle Bagwell, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Robert W. Staiger*
I. A LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH TO THE OPTIMAL WTO MANDATE
The Economic Rationale for Trade Agreements
In this paper, we argue that market access issues associated with the question of the opti-
mal mandate of the World Trade Organization should be separated from nonmarket access
issues. We identify race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues
and suggest that the WTIO should address these concerns. We then describe ways that WTO
principles and procedures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues,
we argue that as a general matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while
implicit links might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other labor and
environmental organizations should not as a general matter be forged. We view this as a
measured approach to labor and the environment within the WTO.
To provide the foundation for our proposals, we first present an economic framework.'
Suppose there are two countries, country A and country B, whose respective governments
are government A and government B. Country A exports good a to country B, and country
B exports good 3 to country A. The two governments each choose import tariffs, and they
may also select export policies and domestic policies (such as labor and environmental stan-
dards). For now, we focus on the selection of import tariffs. Given that this world has no
trade agreement, each government selects its import tariff in a unilateral fashion (i.e., to
best achieve its own policy objectives).
Consider now the trade-offs that government A perceives when it sets its import tariff on
good P. A higher import tariff leads to a higher price of good /3 in country A. As a conse-
quence, there are winners and losers in country A: the higher price benefits its import-
competing firms and hurts its consumers. Of course, depending on the level of the tariff,
an increase may also generate greater tariff revenue for country A, and these proceeds may
be distributed to consumers so as to ease (or even reverse) the harm to them. By assessing
these various effects and weighing how they contribute to or detract from its objectives, gov-
ernment A determines the unilateral tariff that best achieves its objectives. In similar fashion,
government B determines its preferred unilateral tariff on good a.
Government A's calculus of winners and losers neglects an important party: the exporters
from country B. Exporting firms would naturally be expected to bear some of the incidence
of a tax. Put differently, if the import tariff on good/ is raised by a dollar, then the price of
good P in country A is likely to rise by something short of a dollar. Some of the tariff hike
' Kyle Bagwell, KelvinJ. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory, Department of Economics and Graduate
School of Business, Columbia University, Petros C. Mavroidis, Faculty of Law, University of Neuchfitel; and Robert
AV. Staiger, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison. We would like to thank Henrik Horn
af Rantzien for very helpful discussions.
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would then be absorbed by the exporting firms, which is to say that the export price they
receive would be reduced. Government B, which cares about the profits earned by its ex-
porters, thus experiences a cost when government A selects a higher import tariff.' Since
government A does not internalize the full (i.e., worldwide) costs of a higher import tariff,
it will set a tariff that is higher than would be efficient from a worldwide perspective, where
efficiency isjudged in relation to the objectives of governments A and B. Of course, govern-
ment B views the situation in a symmetrical way, so that the-governments in a world without
a trade agreement have a problem: tariffs are too high.
Faced with this problem, the governments might seek a solution in the form of a trade
agreement. A government would approach the negotiating table with the view that any cut
in its own tariff (below its preferred unilateral rate) would be a concession. But it might be
willing to make such a concession if the other government reciprocated with a concession
of its own. In this way, the governments could undo some of the costs that their unilateral poli-
cies imposed on each other's exporters and thus arrive at a more efficient arrangement. In-
deed, they could mutually gain only if they negotiated reciprocal reductions in their tariffs.
A trade agreement of this kind can succeed only if it includes scope for enforcement. At
the negotiated tariff levels, all else being equal, each government would like to withdraw its
concession and raise its tariff toward the preferred unilateral rate. But a government's tempta-
tion to withdraw a concession would be moderated if it believed that the other government
would retaliate by withdrawing its own concession, as a withdrawal would induce movement
back toward the unilateral outcome. In broad terms, then, negotiated concessions can be
enforced if the trade agreement includes appropriate provisions for retaliation.
What we have described here is the "terms-of-trade" rationale for trade agreements. The
central idea is that the import tariff of any one country reduces the terms of trade for its
trading partners (i.e., the export price received by foreign exporters as compared to the
export price received by the country's own exporters abroad) and thereby generates a
negative pecuniary externality abroad. The consequence is a terms-of-trade-driven "Prisoners'
Dilemma," in which tariffs are inefficiently high. While we have described this problem in
simple terms, it turns out that in a very broad set of circumstances this is the underlying
problem that a trade agreement might solve. We note that this theoretical perspective leads
naturally to a discussion of terms like concessions, reciprocity, enforcement, and retaliation, which
also appear in GATIT/WTO parlance. Before pursuing this link further, however, we pause
and briefly consider some common objections to this rationale.
Objections to the Economic Rationale for Trade Agreements
We consider here five objections to the terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements. In each
case, we state the objection and then argue that it is misguided.
First, one could raise the question whether politics matter. In this vein, one could ask
whether the terms-of-trade theory assumes that governments maximize national income. If
so, the theory omits an important dimension, since real governments have important politi-
cal motivations associated with the distribution of income.
In response to this objection, we point out that the terms-of-trade theory does not rely on
the assumption that governments maximize national income. Nowhere in the above discus-
sion is it assumed that governments are apolitical agents. We assume thata tariff hike by one
government harms foreign exporters and thus the foreign government, but we allow that
the foreign government may be concerned with the profits of its exporters for both eco-
nomic and political reasons. Evidently, whether or not governments are politically motivated,
a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners' Dilemma is theproblem that a trade agreement can solve.
ICountry B's consumers may gain from the lower price that a higher country A tariff implies, but their eco-
nomic gain will be small in comparison to the loss to country B's exporters.
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Second, one might also object that this approach is misguided since it is well-known that
unilateral free trade is the optimal economic policy: something must be off here, because
economists are always saying that this is indeed the case.
In response to this objection, we note that unilateral free trade can be optimal for a gov-
ernment, but only under restricted conditions: when the government maximizes national
income and represents a small country. Whatdoes itmean that a country is small? If country
A is small, then a dollar increase in import tariff on good 03 will lead to a dollar increase in
the price of good P in country A. The full tariff is then "passed through" to the consumer
and foreign exporters are not affected; there is no terms-of-trade externality. As small coun-
tries retain all of the benefits and costs of their tariff policies, the governments of such
countries select their policies in an efficient manner even in unilateral settings. If these gov-
ernments are national-income maximizers, then the efficient policies they select will corre-
spond to unilateral free trade.
Third, one could further object that only a few countries are really large. Is it not true that
only the very largest traders, like the United States and the European Union, can affect their
terms of trade by their tariff choices?
In response to this objection, we note that it is really an empirical question, and that the
studies made to date, which are summarized by Bagwell and Staiger, suggest that terms-of-
trade externalities are common and significant. Here, we simply offer an intuitive response.
If a country is truly small, exporters will be indifferent to the tariffs faced there, so that
governments will have no incentive to dispute a small country's tariff policy.Yetwe often see
disputes between ostensibly small countries.
Fourth, one could also object that what is argued here sounds like the long-discredited
idea of mercantilism.
In response to this objection, we note that a government is mercantilistic if it believes that
(1) exports are good, regardless of the policy (higher domestic export subsidies, lower for-
eign import tariffs) that induces greater exports; and (2) imports are bad, regardless of the
policy (lower domestic import tariffs, higher foreign export subsidies) that induces greater
imports. By contrast, the terms-of-trade theory that we described above ascribes to each
government a much more sophisticated outlook: (1) exports are good when additional
exports are enjoyed as a consequence of a unilateral reduction in the foreign import tariff;
(2) imports are bad when additional imports are experienced as a consequence of a uni-
lateral reduction in the domestic import tariff, and (3) reciprocal increases in imports and
exports can be good when they are achieved through reciprocal import tariff reductions.
Finally, one could object that it is economic nonsense to regard a unilateral tariff reduction
as a concession. Does standard economic theory not say that unilateral liberalization is good?
In response to this objection, we note that standard economic theory says that any uni-
lateral change (up or down) from a government's unilaterally chosen tariffs is a "conces-
sion," if by concession one means a policy action that by itself is costly for a government to
undertake. What the terms-of-trade theory says beyond this is twofold: starting from uni-
lateral tariff choices, (1) only tariff concessions of the liberalizingvariety can confer benefits
on one's trading partners; and (2) provided that countries are large enough to affect their
terms of trade with their unilateral tariff choices, the benefit conferred on each government
from a (liberalizing) concession granted by its trading partners is greater than the cost
incurred by each government in granting a reciprocal (equal trade volume) concession of its
own. Hence, negotiated tariff concessions can produce mutual gains for governments only
if (at least some) countries are large and the concessions entail (broadly) reciprocal tariff
reductions.
3 BAGW'ELL & STAIGER, GATT-THiNK, supra note 1.
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Market Access in the GATT/WTIO
In general terms, the GATT/WTO offers a forum within which its member governments
may negotiate over market access. Market access is interpreted in the GATT/WTO as re-
flecting the competitive relationship between imported and domestic products. For example,
when government A agrees to reduce an import tariff on good 3, it alters the competitive
relationship between imported and domestic units of 3 in favor of imported units and thus
provides greater market access to foreign producers. Likewise, if government A raises its
import tariff on good /3, then the competitive relationship will be tilted in favor of domestic
units, which implies diminished market access for foreign producers.
As we noted above, in GATT/WTO negotiations governments commonly view their tariff
reductions as concessions whose cost is warranted only when an offsetting benefit is ob-
tained from a reciprocal tariff concession by a trading partner. On a broad level, we can
interpret the GATT/WTO legal structure as facilitating such mutually advantageous increases
in the degree of market access.
Of course, if governments adopt this mind-set, a successful agreement must also provide
rules that work to secure market access commitments. After all, government A will not grant
a reduction of its tariff in exchange for a tariff reduction by government B ifA suspects that
the corresponding access of its exporters to country B's market will not be secure. GAIT rules
play a role here, too. By proscribing certain forms of policy intervention (e.g., policies that
discriminate against foreign products), the GATT provides governments with additional assur-
ance that the tariff concessions they win from trading partners in negotiations will actually
deliver the benefits they are after, namely, better market access for their exporting firms.
At the same time, governments are not held rigidly to their negotiated market access
levels. For example, they may renegotiate their market access commitments, provided that
they satisfy the explicit renegotiation provisions contained in GA'T Article XXVIII. Under
these provisions, a government may modify or withdraw a tariff concession, but in return it
must offer compensating tariff concessions on other products or else accept equivalent with-
drawals of concessions by its affected trading partners. Thus, governments are not held
rigidly to the level of market access commitments implied by their negotiations. But they are
held to the balance of market access commitments implied by their negotiations.
In broad terms, then, we may interpret GATT articles as (1) facilitating negotiations that
lead to mutually advantageous increases in market access levels, and (2) creating a system
of property rights over negotiated market access commitments that are secure against uni-
lateral governmental infringement.
One may ask to what extent the above relates to the economic rationale for trade agree-
ments. Consider, first, what happens when government A lowers its import tariff on good
P. Government A then offers the exporters of country B a gain in the level of market access
in the following formal sense: country A's import demand curve is shifted outward, with the
consequence that a greater volume of imports is demanded at any given price from country
B's exporters. As a result of this shift, the exporters from country B can expect to receive a
higher export price. But that is simply to say that country B receives a terms-of-trade gain
when government A reduces its import tariff.
Suppose next that government A decides to renegotiate its tariff on good 3 to a higher
level. The resulting inward shift of country A's import demand curve implies a withdrawal
of market access for country B's exporters, which can now expect to receive a lower export
price. This amounts to a terms-of-trade loss for country B. But if as a result of these renegoti-
ations government B withdraws an equivalent amount of market access by raising its tariff
on good a and inducing an equivalent inward shift of country B's import demand curve,
then the balance of market access commitments between countries A and B will be pre-
served. Consequently, country A's exporters can expect to receive a lower export price as
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well, which is simply to say that the overall terms-of-trade change will be neutralized if gov-
ernment B responds to government A's tariff hike with a reciprocal tariff increase of its own.
These examples point to a bridge between the terms-of-trade rationale for trade agree-
ments and the market access emphasis found in the GATr/WTO. This bridge indicates that
the terms-of-trade rationale for trade agreements and the market access emphasis found in
the GATr/WIO are simply two different ways of saying the same thing. In general, a govern-
ment that is concerned about the impact of a trading partner's market access restrictions
on the prices received by its own exporters is concerned about the terms-of-trade effects of
that trading partner's policies. The reduced export price (diminished terms of trade) isjust
the price effect induced by the corresponding reduction in export volume that restricted
market access implies. And rules that prevent any government from unilaterally upsetting
the balance of negotiated market access commitments equivalently prevent unilateral manipu-
lation of the terms of trade. Therefore, the terms-of-trade logic can be completely recast in
terms of market access concerns.
In accordance with this logic, we may conclude from the terms-of-trade theory that the
fundamentalproblem to be solved by a trade agreement is insufficient market access. When
a government imposes an import tariff, it does not internalize the harm that foreign ex-
porters incur where this harm can be interpreted equivalently as a terms-of-trade loss or a
restriction of market access, and unilateral policies therefore result in insufficient market
access. This problem can be solved by a trade agreement that facilitates the exchange and
security of greater market access commitments.
Standards
In the above framework, governments choose nothing but trade policies and the funda-
mental problem is insufficient market access. Does a further problem arise when govern-
ments choose standards? Assuming that standards choices do not create an international
nonpecuniary externality, we now establish that the answer to this question is no. Insuffi-
cient market access remains the fundamental problem that a trade agreement may solve.
Let us extend the framework to include standards choices by supposing that government
A considers a reduction in the standards for its import-competing industry. This policy
change would reduce the production costs of the import-competing firms in country A in
much the same way as granting a new or increased domestic production subsidy. Once
again, there would be winners and losers in country A, and these trade-offs would be inter-
nalized by government A in accordance with its own objectives. But the policy change would
also affect exporters from country B. Facing tougher domestic competition, country B's
exporters would obtain a lower export price, and country Bwould thus experience a terms-
of-trade loss. Equally, country B's exporters would encounter diminished access to country
A's market. As government A would not internalize this cost, its preferred unilateral stan-
dards would fall to a lower than efficient level.
As this discussion confirms, the inefficiency of unilateral policies derives from one funda-
mental problem: each government sets its unilateral policies in a manner that delivers insuf-
ficient market access, since it fails to internalize the cost of diminished market access to its
trading partner. This fundamental problem is then manifested through the unilateral deter-
mination of the various policy instruments, with import tariffs that are too high and/or
standards in import-competing industries that are too low.
To put the point another way, suppose that government A has made a market access com-
mitment to government B and that A can fulfill its commitment by adopting any "policy
mix" that it desires. For example, government A could fulfill its commitment while setting
standards at a low level in the import-competing industry if it also adopts low tariffs. Once
the market access commitment is fulfilled, government B does not have any (pecuniary)
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reason to concern itself with the particular policy mix that government A uses. Government
A's policies are relevant in government B's view only insofar as they affect the terms of trade
and thus the overall access of country B's exporters to country A's market.
Race to the Bottom and Regulatory Chill
As the preceding discussion establishes, once an agreement secures an efficient market
access commitment, no further problem remains: given a market access commitment, a gov-
ernment retains all of the costs and benefits of any adjustment in its policy mix, and an ef-
ficient policy mix is therefore selected. By contrast, the public debate about agreements on
trade and standards policies centers on the perception of a "race-to-the-bottom" problem,
in which governments face pressure to weaken their domestic labor and environmental stan-
dards for competitive effect in the international marketplace. This perception, in turn, has
led to calls for agreements that would disallow standards below some minimal level, and
that would thus prevent the adoption of low standards thought to fuel a race to the bottom.
How, if at all, are race-to-the-bottom concerns interpreted in the framework developed above?
To begin to connect the framework with the public debate, we must consider the policy
mix options that are actually available to governments. In particular, when governments
expand market access through a GATT/WTO negotiation on tariff bindings, property rights
over market access commitments are imperfect. First, while under GATT/WTO rules a govern-
ment cannot respond to competitive pressures abroad by unilaterally restricting market
access with an increase in its tariff (unless it is willing to pay compensation), the government
may be tempted to restrict access by reducing standards in its import-competing industry.
Second, if a government increases standards in its import-competing industry, this industry
would be subjected to increased competitive pressure from abroad, but the government
would not be allowed under GATT/WTO rules to raise its tariff (without compensation) and
maintain its market access commitment. Consequently, the government might refrain from
raising standards in an import-competing industry, since some of the benefits would flow
to foreign exporters. Fundamentally, each of these described imperfections in property
rights over market access commitments concerns the means at a government's disposal to
respond to competitive pressures from abroad.
The first imperfection-that under GATT/WTO rules market access commitments are not
secure against unilateral infringement by adjustingstandards in import-competing industries-
can lead to a race to the bottom, in which standards in import-competing industries are
lowered. The second imperfection-that under GATT/WTO rules a government is not free
to adjust its policy mix as it desires so long as it maintains its market access commitment-
can lead to a "regulatory chill," in which governments refrain from raising standards in
import-competing industries. If GAT!T/WTO rules were enhanced to secure market access
commitments against unilateral infringement through changes in trade or standards poli-
des, while allowing each government to fulfill its market access commitment with the policy mix
that it prefers, there would be no race-to-the-bottom or regulatorychill problems of this nature.
The preceding discussion suggests a striking conclusion in light of the public debate: the
true source of the race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill problems is not that low foreign
standards generate competitive pressures that induce inefficiently low domestic standards;
rather, the real source of these problems is the imperfections in property rights4 over market
access commitments that arise when governments consider changing their own standards.
It may be objected, however, that we have developed this conclusion with reference only
to standards choices in import-competing industries. Could it be that low standards levels
in the foreign export industry give rise to competitive pressures that lead to inefficiently low
4We understand the term "property rights" over market access commitments to mean thata WTO member has
a legal claim to request that the value of negotiated market access commitments be honored.
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standards in the domestic import-competing industry? Or could low standards levels in the
foreign import-competing industry give rise to competitive pressures that lead to ineffi-
ciently low standards in the domestic export industry? Or even that low standards levels in
the foreign export industry could lead to the choice of low standards in the domestic export
industry as well, if exporters in both countries are competing for markets in a third country.
The answer to the first of the three questions raised above is no. Whether the competitive
pressures that might lead the domestic government to set inefficiently low import-compet-
ing standards arise as a result of weak foreign export standards or strong foreign export
technologies is irrelevant to the emergence of a race-to-the-bottom or regulatory-chill prob-
lem: as we observed above, what matters is the means that a government has at its disposal
to respond to these competitive pressures, that is, whether or not property rights over market
access commitments are imperfect.
The answer to the second question is also no. As in answer to the first question, the source
of the competitive pressure does not bear on the existence of race-to-the-bottom or regu-
latory-chill problems. Again, what is relevant is whether or not property rights over market
access commitments are imperfect. And in the case of export-industry standards, property
rights imperfections will lead, if anything, to standards levels that are set too high.5
The answer to the third question raised above is more subtle. We thus extend the eco-
nomic framework developed above to include competing export industries.
Competing Export Industries
Consider, then, a three-country framework, in which countries B and C export good 1 to
country A, while country A exports good a to countries Band C. As the strategic-trade litera-
ture has established, Governments B and Cmight each be tempted to use an export subsidy
strategically so as to improve the competitive position of its own exporters.' The end result
could be a mutually destructive "subsidy war" that, ironically, would benefit only country A's
consumers. Governments B and Cmight then seek an agreement in which they would lower
(or even ban) export subsidies, with a view to restraining their destructive impulses. This is
one way, for example, to interpret the GATT/WTO negotiations over the reduction of agri-
cultural export subsidies.
Suppose now that countries B and C succeed in forming an agreement that reduces (or
prohibits) export subsidies. Then the same pattern might play out with standards: govern-
ments B and Cmight fall into a mutually destructive battle, as each relaxes (or at least resists
increasing) the standards in its export industry in an attempt to improve the competitive
position of its own exporters. Once again, in the end only country A's consumers would
benefit. Governments Band Cmight thus seek an agreement to raise standards, again with
the goal of restraining their destructive behavior.
In the three-country extension just described, externalities continue to run through the
terms of trade. When government B subsidizes its exporters or relaxes its export-industry
standards, the price of good P falls on the world market and the exporters from country C
experience diminished terms of trade. Equivalently, once exporters from country B increase
their production, exporters from country Cwill find that their access to country A's market
is diminished.
The difference between this case and the first case raised above can be understood as follows. In the two-
country model, the terms-of-trade theory implies that, in the presence of imperfect property rights over market
access commitments, governments distort their standards choices subsequent to tariff negotiations so as to frus-
trate the full liberalizing implications of their tariff commitments. In the particular case of export-industry stan-
dards, this consideration implies that, if anything, standards will be set too high relative to efficient levels.
6 James Brander & Barbara Spencer, Export Subsidies and Market Share Rivalry, 18J. INT'L ECON. 83 (1985);
Giovanni Maggi, Strategic Trade Polity with En-dogenous Mode of Competition, 86 Ai. ECON. REv. 237 (1996).
'Kyle Bagweli & Robert W. Staiger, Strategic Trade, Competitive Industries andAgricultural TradeDisputes, 13 ECON.
POL 113 (2001).
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The three-country model gives rise to a novel interpretation of race-to-the-bottom and
regulatory-chill problems. The choice oflow export-industry standards in one country might
encourage similar choices in other countries whose exporters compete for the same mar-
kets. From the perspective of the exporting governments, unilateral policy selection may thus
lead to export-industry standards that are inefficiently low. This possibility is plausibly exac-
erbated when an agreement to restrain export subsidies is in place. Competing exporting
governments may then gain from a further agreement to raise standards in export industries.
It bears emphasizing, however, that the welfare of importing governments would be re-
duced by such an agreement. In fact, the terms-of-trade theory suggests that such an agree-
ment would diminish the ability of all the governments together to attain their individual
objectives (i.e., such an agreement would be inefficient from a worldwide perspective in
relation to the objectives of all the participating governments). The expansionary unilateral
export policies that are selected by competing exporting governments engender a terms-of-
trade gain for consumers in the importing country.
If their agreement induces exporting governments to internalize this gain, thus choosing
efficient export policies from a worldwide perspective, they would in fact adopt export poli-
cies that are more expansionary than their unilateral choices, not less.
Linking the Framework to the Public Debate
In summary, our framework gives some credence to the race-to-the-bottom/regulatory-
chill fears emphasized in the public debate, but it does so in a limited and structured way
that has important implications for the appropriate institutional response. According to our
framework, in the absence of any nonpecuniary externality associated with the level of stan-
dards, two governments may face race-to-the-bottom or regulatory-chill problems that moti-
vate them to negotiate standards for either of two reasons:
(1) Under GATT/WTO rules, property rights over market access commitments are im-
perfect. Standards in import-competing industries may thus be inefficiently low from
the perspective of global government welfare.
(2) Governments with competing exporters may strategically lower standards with the
goal of improving the competitive positions of their respective exporters. Standards in
exporting industries may thus be inefficiently low from the perspective of the objectives
of the exporting governments.
What is the appropriate institutional response? The first reason describes a legitimate
standards problem: an agreement that eliminates this reason for low standards could benefit
all governments. In this context, our framework suggests that the appropriate institutional
response is to strengthen governments' property rights over negotiated market access com-
mitments. By contrast, the second reason describes a standards problem that may be less
legitimate: an agreement that eliminates this reason for low standards could represent an
inefficientvictory for exporting governments won at the expense of importing governments.
General Approach
We now propose a general approach based on the following guiding principles:
- governments can mutually benefit from negotiated policy changes that increase
market access levels;
- negotiated market access commitments must be secure against unilateral govern-
ment infringement where such infringement might derive from adjustments in
tariffs or standards; and
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- governments should be free to satisfy their market access commitments by using
whatever policy mix they desire.
To see the guiding principles in action, let us consider import policies. Under an agree-
ment that respected these principles, governments could negotiate lower import tariffs and/
or higher import-competing standards so as to achieve efficient market access levels. Their
respective market access commitments would also be secure: neither government could uni-
laterally infringe its commitment, by adjusting its import tariff upward and/or its import-
competing standard downward. At the same time, a government would not be restricted
from adjusting the policy mix to maintain its market access commitment. Such adjustments
would not have an impact on foreign exporters. Since the costs and benefits of such an
adjustment would reside entirelywithin domestic borders, a government would pursue such
an adjustment only if it were (internally) efficient.
This approach facilitates a negotiated movement toward greater market access through
lower tariffs and/or higher import-competing standards. Importantly, this movement can
be made even if direct negotiations concern tariffs alone. Given any initial standards, the
governments can negotiate tariffs that would achieve the desired level of market access.
Subsequent to this negotiation, if a government seeks to lower its standards from the initial
level, it can, provided that it also lowers its import tariff so as to maintain its market access
commitment. Similarly, if a government then seeks to increase its standards, it would be
permitted to raise its import tariff and thus maintain its market access commitment. In this
way, once negotiated market access levels are determined, each government can reconfigure
its policy mix to fulfill its market access commitment in the preferred manner.
This approach also has implications for export policy. Suppose that a government would
like to raise standards in its export industry but is concerned that its exporters would then
be at a competitive disadvantage relative to competing foreign exporters. In short, the gov-
ernment fears that increasing domestic standards would reduce its exporters' access to the
importing country's market. Under our approach, the government would not face this fear:
it would be allowed to raise its standards and at the same time increase its export subsidy,
so that the market access of its exporters would notbe altered (in either direction). This ap-
proach ensures that the adjustment in the export policy mix will not affect the export price,
guaranteeing that the full costs and benefits of the adjustment are retained within national
borders. Consequently, under this approach a government will choose its export-industry
policy mix in an (internally) efficient manner.
Cross-Country Linkage
The general approach described above draws linkages between the trade and standards
policies within the same country. The theoretical framework suggests that such internal
linkages are sufficient. This perspective also resonates nicely with the notion of national
sovereignty: in essence, each government is allowed to do as it pleases, so long as its policy
changes do not violate its negotiated market access commitments.
At a practical level, however, the proposed internal linkages may not always be feasible.
First of all, export policies are already heavily restrained under GATT/WTO rules. In the
current legal environment, therefore, a government may have insufficient flexibility to
counterbalance the export-price effects of changes in its export-industry standards. A second
reason why internal linkages may not be feasible, which is especially significant for some
developing countries, is that an exporting government may be unable to finance a signifi-
cant export-subsidization policy. If a government's ability to use export subsidies is con-
strained for these (or other) reasons, it may not be able to increase export-industry stan-
dards while maintaining its exporters' access to the importing country's market. Export-
industry standards could then become frozen at inefficiently low levels.
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If such constraints are unavoidable, cross-country linkages might be considered. For
example, higher export-industry standards in one country could be linked with lower import
tariffs in another. This linkage might offer a feasible means of raising export-industry stan-
dards while preserving exporters' access to the importing-country market.
At the same time, it should be understood that cross-country linkages raise new diffi-
culties. Notably, cross-country policy adjustments that maintain market access (and thus the
terms of trade) may exert a pecuniary effect on the welfare of the importing government.
Such adjustments introduce a local-price externality: by altering its tariff, the importing
government generates a different local (consumption) price for the imported good. There
is no guarantee that the local-price change will be beneficial to the importing government,
or that the change in standards is attractive to the exporting government. Thus, the negoti-
ating environment of cross-country linkages is complex and the identification of a simple
set of guiding principles that can confidently be expected to promote efficient policies
becomes more difficult.
With the economic framework now in hand, we proceed in part II to make specific pro-
posals that implement the general approach described above for internal linkages. We
postpone a full discussion of cross-country linkages until part III, where we broaden our
framework and consider nonpecuniary externalities. The presence of such externalities fur-
ther motivates consideration of cross-country linkages, and we offer specific proposals for
cross-country linkages in that part.
II. LABOR AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PECUNIARY EXTERNALrrES
The Race to the Bottom: Nonviolation Complaints
Does the WTO contract, as it now stands, encompass legal instruments that ensure that
a race to the bottom with respect to standards will not take place? As we stated above, such
a risk is not simply imaginary: some WTO members might have an incentive to lower their
standards.
From the legal perspective, the answer runs as follows: the WTO contract does not contain
any provisions that oblige the members to adopt any particular conductwith respect to stan-
dards. Hence, they are in principle free to raise or lower their standards. To the extent,
however, that a change in the standards affects market access for foreign products, a WTO
member might find itself the addressee of a nonviolation complaint. According to continu-
ing GATr/WTO case law, nonviolation complaints are admissible when (1) a concession has
been negotiated, and (2) a subsequent measure is adopted that (3) could not have reasonably
been anticipated and that (4) reduces the value of the negotiated concession."
What is crucial is point (2): the subsequent measure can be perfectly legal. Still, the WTO
member responsible for such a measure is obliged to respond to the allegation that its action
resulted in reducing the value of the negotiated concession.
The rationale for nonviolation complaints may be understood in terms of the need to
make negotiated market access commitments secure against unilateral infringement, with
the knowledge that such infringement could occur through legal changes in any of various
measures. A WTO member has a greater incentive to offer the concession of access to its
own market when it is confident that its negotiated access to its trading partner's market is
secure. When market access commitments are made more secure, therefore, the potential
for liberalization is enhanced.
Throughout the GATT years, the subsequent measure involved, in all but one case, the
granting of a subsidy to a domestic producer that led to import substitution. In the WTO
8 See, e.g., European Communities-Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and
Related Animal-Feed Proteins,Jan. 25, 1990, GATr B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86, 128-29 (1991).
2002]
THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
era, the notorious Kodak-Fuji litigation made it clear that regulatory subsidies can be the
object of anonviolation complaint. 9At the same time, thatvery Kodak-Fujipanel report held
for the proposition that nonviolation complaints are truly exceptional legal instruments that
should not be used lightly; otherwise, WTO adjudicating bodies might end up pronouncing
on any regulatory intervention that might have indirect market access incidence. Does this
holding still prevail? Most likely, not. In the recent Asbestos report, the Appellate Body held
for the position that a nonviolation complaint can have a health-based measure with a trade
incidence as its subject matter."
A possible argument against this position might run as follows. It is difficult to maintain
that countries will not enforce health measures when appropriate. Public health (albeit with
variations) is a truly universal value. Because of its universal character, one can hardly imag-
ine that WTO members would claim that they could not anticipate that a trading partner
would block exports to its market for health reasons. Therefore, nonviolation complaints
against health-based measures can never satisfy the "reasonable expectations" requirement,
since it is unreasonable to expect that WTO members will not adopt health measures that
conform with the WTO contractwhen and where warranted." However, an argument along
these lines was dismissed by the Appellate Body in the Asbestos case. 2
We can reasonably conclude that, if a nonviolation complaint is feasible against a health-
based measure with trade incidence, it could well be feasible as regards "relaxation" of labor
and environmental standards. In fact, at least in the case of labor standards, the impact on
the value of the concession will in all likelihood be more immediate: unlike health-based
measures, which have to be nondiscriminatory (that is, applicable to both domestic and
foreign products), a relaxation of labor standards will by definition confer an advantage on
domestic products only.
This is not the end of the story, though. The remedy when a nonviolation complaint suc-
ceeds is that a WTO adjudicating body will recommend a "mutually satisfactory adjustment." 3
Exactly what a "mutually satisfactory adjustment" amounts to is hard to say. There is no
positive case law in this respect. Yet as Article 26.1(b) of the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 4 makes clear, a "mutually satisfactory
adjustment" does not involve the obligation to withdraw the challenged measure. It could
9 SeeJapan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (Mar. 31,
1998). In this case, the panel did not reject the U.S. complaint, which was directed, inter alia, against lax enforce-
ment of Japanese competition laws. Thus, in principle, it accepted that such an allegation can constitute a
nonviolation complaint if, of course, the value of negotiated market access commitments is reduced as a result
of lax enforcement of antitrust laws.
" See European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc.
W'IT/DS135/AB/R, paras. 182-97 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Asbestos Report).
11 W TO members might attempt a different approach: it might be claimed that the circumstances at hand do
not present a legitimate health-based reason for blocking trade. Butwith such an approach, they will be arguing
that their trading partner's decision to block trade on health grounds violates the WTO contract. The condition
to move to a nonviolation complaint is precisely that no violation of the WTO contract has occurred.
1 iParagraph 188 of the Asbestos Report, supra note 10, reads:
The European Communities also contends that the Panel erred in finding thatArticle XXIII:I (b) applies
to measures which pursue health, rather than commercial, objectives and which can, therefore, be
justified under Article XX(b) of the GATIT 1994. Once again, we look to the text of Article XXII:1 (b),
which provides that "the application by another Member of any measure" may give rise to a cause of
action under that provision. The use of the word "any" suggests that measures ofal types may give rise
to such a cause of action. The text does not distinguish between, or exclude, certain types of measure.
Clearly, therefore, the textofArticle XXfII:I (b) contradicts the European Communities' argumentthat
certain types of measure, namely, those with health objectives, are excluded from the scope of appli-
cation of Article XXIII:I (b).
"
3 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes, Art. 26.1 (b) [hereinafter
DSU], in Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, in WORLD
TRADEORGANIZAnON,THELEGALTEXS: THERESULTSOFTHEURUGUAYROUND OFMULTATERALTRADENEGOI-
ATIONS 354 (1999).
'" Supra note 13.
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hence be argued that nonviolation complaints do not per se constitute a credible threat
against those WTO members that might have an incentive to lower their standards.
This does not mean, however, that the use of nonviolation complaints should be discour-
aged. Active use of this instrument automatically leads to enhanced transparency with regard
to the domestic policy choices. Moreover, a "mutually satisfactory adjustment" can occasionally
prove to be a powerful weapon in itself. some WTO members will have to ponder whether
lowering their standards is really worth it if they have to face higher entry barriers in their
export markets as a result. The compensation they will have to pay (higher entry barriers)
might remove much of the incentive to relax their standards. Indeed, if the prospect of this
compensation works to secure market access commitments against unilateral government
infringement, it will prevent the race-to-the-bottom problem from arising. To conclude, in
practice nonviolation complaints can prove to be a useful instrument from this perspective.
So far we have addressed the usefulness of nonviolation complaints as an instrument to
discourage a race to the bottom in a purely bilateral scenario. Nonviolation complaints can
play a role in the competing-exporters scenario as well: imagine that countries A and B
export to country C and that all three countries are WTO members. If country B were to
lower its standards, then the volume of exports from country A to country Cwould be reduced
(or even eliminated). In this case, country Cis not competing in the product market at hand
and so in all likelihood would welcome the reduction in country B's standards. And, as we
discussed above, the government of country B might indeed gain from this reduction.
In such a case, country A can challenge country B's actions through recourse to a nonvio-
lation complaint. 5 Indeed, in the case where country C does not compete in the product
market at hand, a nonviolation complaint by country A against country B is all there is to
avoid a race to the bottom. At the same time, it should be recalled that the legitimacy of the
standards problem is less clear in the competing-export scenario, since an increase in export-
industry standards would then harm country C.
On the basis of this discussion and the general approach described in the previous part,
we propose that an active role for nonviolation complaints be encouraged. 6 An active role
would help to secure market access commitments against unilateral government infringe-
ment through lower standards, and thus would work to guard against a race to the bottom
while also facilitating greater incentives for trade liberalization.
Regulatory Chill: Renegotiation
Of course, a country could decide to raise its standards unilaterally. Unilateral behavior
to this effect can be encouraged through a "creative" reading of GATT Article XXVIII.
Normally, Article XXVIII (and the corresponding Article XXI of the General Agreement
on Trade in Services) is invoked when a WTO member wants to modify its schedule of con-
cessions (which reflects the agreed balance of concessions at the end of a trade round). But
suppose a country requests Article XXVIHI7 negotiations when it decides to raise standards
" A case like this has never been brought in WTO case law. Indeed, one might be tempted to argue that from a
legal perspective such a case could never see the light of day. However, the wording of GATTArticle XXIII.1 (b) and,
more specifically, the term "indirectly" reflected there suggest that such a possibility is not excluded a priori.
"'We are well aware of the limits of this proposal. In the absence ofexofficiocomplaints to this effect and a WTO
ombudsman, the extent to which more nonviolation complaints will be brought against N%7O members racing
to the bottom will ultimately depend on the willingness of the leaders of the world community to punish such
behavior. Subsidizingsuch complaints domestically is an option that deserves to be examined by national authori-
ties. Anyway, at least the European Community and the United States, through the penetration of their private
sector in almost all WTO markets and their strong public presence (embassies, etc.) all over the world, have the
wherewithal to collect information in this context. All they need is the incentive to process the information and
bring countries before the VTO.
" GATT' Article XXVIII allows WTO members to rebalance the level of their commitments. Under Article
XXVIII, whenever aWTO memberwishes to increase its bound protection on an item, it must offer compensation
on another item.
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in an import-competing industry. This country would in fact be requesting permission to
raise its consolidated tariff protection in a particular sector. And instead of paying com-
pensation by reducing its consolidated tariff protection in another sector (as normally
happens under Article XXVIII of the GATT), the country in question would be "compensat-
ing" by raising its standards.
The spirit of this proposal is in line with the spirit of Article XXVIII, which in paragraph 2
pertinently states that "[i] n such negotiations and agreement,. . the contracting parties
concerned shall endeavour to maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advanta-
geous concessions not less favourable to trade than that provided for in this Agreement
prior to such negotiations." Imagine, for example, that Pooria, a WTO member, has bound
its tariffs with respect to imports of wheat at 20 percent. As a result, 50 percent of wheat con-
sumption in its market is satisfied by imports and 50 percent by domestic production. Pooria
has no labor law at all, but it wants to become a good international citizen and decides to
guarantee the core labor rights in its territory. A consulting firm advises Pooria that doing
so would diminish its productivity, so that it would need to raise its duties for wheat to 28
percent to maintain the level of imports described above. What we propose here is that
Pooria should be allowed to raise its duties in exchange for a promise to implement the
agreed-upon labor standards without incurring any other obligation to make compensation.
Note that our proposal is applicable only when the government wishing to raise its stan-
dards does so with respect to an import-competing industry. If the government instead
raised standards in an export industry, then its (importing) trading partners would experi-
ence a terms-of-trade loss: exports to those countries would be more expensive as a result
of the cost-of-production increase entailed by an increase in standards. Thus, the trading
partners would appropriately resist any compensation that this government might seek.
Regulatoy Chill. Renegotiation Plus
The WTO could even provide an extra incentive to WTO members to raise their standards
by making it explicit in GAT Article XXVIII that it can be used as a means to rebalance
concessions against a rise in standards in import-competing industries. For example, one
could add a new paragraph 6 to Article XXVIII that could read as follows:
If they so decide, WTO Members wishing to raise their labor standards and imple-
ment the standards reflected in ILO Conventions will be allowed to raise the level of
their bound duties without incurring the obligation to compensate injured WTO
Members. In case of disagreement as to the level of the increase, the dispute will be
submitted to an arbitrator, who will decide on the level of increase within ... days.
Thus, the same level of market access would be preserved and the WTO member raising its
labor standards would not be punished when doing so. Similar language could be added
with regard to environmental standards.
Such an approach (an Article XXVIII plus) would naturally require a legislative amend-
ment. The meeting in Qatar, however, signals the advent of a new round and such a
proposal is therefore timely.
IIl. LABOR AND THE ENVlRONiENT: NONPECUNIARY EXTERNALITIES
As a general matter, nonpecuniary externalities arise whenever one party's decisions affect
the welfare of another party through nonmarket channels.'8 At the international level, non-
pecuniary externalities can take many forms, ranging from global-commons issues to humani-
tarian concerns to international political spillovers.
"
8 Of course, in many cases an action that generates a nonpecuniary externality carries implications for market
access as well. In this part, we address actions that generate predominantly nonpecuniary externalities.
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For example, if the government of country A were to adopt a lax environmental law regu-
lating the output of chlorofluorocarbons, the government of country B could have a legiti-
mate concern about the resulting depletion of the ozone layer. Moreover, country B's concern
could remain legitimate, even if country A's policy choice had no market access implications.
Similarly, if country A's fishing fleets were depleting a species that country B valued, then
the government of country B could have a legitimate concern about country A's regulation
of its fishing fleets, even if direct market access issues were not involved.
Nonpecuniary externalities associated with labor standards might arise as well. The Inter-
national Labour Organization refers to two broad issues under which nonpecuniary exter-
nalities could create a problem with the unilateral choice of labor standards that might be
solved through international negotiation. First, country A's weak labor standards may pro-
voke "humanitarian" concerns in country B, if the government of country B has a direct
concern for the well-being of workers in country A. And second, weak labor standards and
poor social conditions in country A may contribute, in the words of the preamble to the ILO
Constitution, to social "unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are im-
perilled," and thus give rise to "political" concerns in country B.
Importantly, the solutions we have proposed above to handle the market access problems
associated with labor and environmental standards do not suffice to solve a problem that
arises instead as a result of a nonpecuniary externality. Hence, the generation of important
nonpecuniary externalities associated with labor and environmental standards requires
additional consideration as to the possible involvement of the AITO.
To see the distinction between these two kinds of problems, suppose that country A chooses
to stop enforcing its minimum wage policy in an import-competing industry. Suppose fur-
ther that the government of country Bis concerned about the change in country A's policy
because of the pecuniary implications of this choice. In particular, country Bmay be worried
about the implications of this policy for its exporting firms. If as a result of this concern
country A is led to make an inefficient unilateral choice, then our discussion above suggests
that a possible solution might entail agreement by the government of country A to mitigate
the market access implications of its minimum wage decision, perhaps by accompanying this
change in its labor standards with a reduction in its import tariff. That step would insulate
the economic well-being of country B's citizens from country A's policy decisions and elimi-
nate the international externality that accounted for the inefficiency of country A's uni-
lateral choice of labor standards, while preserving for the government of country A a degree
of sovereignty over its choice of those standards.
Such a solution, however, which focuses on the market access implications of country A's
labor standards choices, would be ineffective if the government of country B were con-
cerned instead about the implications of country A's change in policy for the welfare of
country A's workers and its humanitarian/political ramifications. In this case, if international
efficiency is to be achieved, a more invasive solution would have to be sought, whereby the
government of country B would be given a voice in country A's decision about whether to
scrap its minimum -wage laws. In particular, it would no longer do simply to provide country
Bwith assurances that decisions made by country A's government would have no important
market access implications.
Finally, if both elements of country B's concern were present in this example, it might
make sense to seek "targeted" solutions, which would address the first concern with market
access agreements and the second with more invasive agreements. A central question then
becomes: To what extent should the WTO become involved in addressing problems associ-
ated with labor and environmental standards that arise as a result of nonpecuniary externalities?
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Possible Involvement of the WTO
In principle, the WTO could become involved at either or both of two distinct levels in
addressing problems associated with labor and environmental standards that arise as a result
of nonpecuniary externalities. First, solutions could be sought through W1TO negotiations;
and second, solutions could be enforced by WTO dispute settlement procedures, whether
or not these solutions were negotiated in the WTO.
The possibility that distinct issues-in this case, market access issues and nonmarket access
issues-might be usefully combined in a single negotiating forum depends in part on the
instruments available to the parties for distributing the gains created by their negotiations.1 9
The possibility that distinct issues might be gainfully linked for enforcement purposes de-
pends in part on whether these issues are viewed as complements (the value of attaining
agreement on one issue rises when agreement on the other issue is reached) or substitutes
(the value of attaining agreement on one issue falls when agreement on the other issue is
reached) in the objectives of governments. ° In short, as we discuss below, whether or not
it is advisable to negotiate and/or enforce solutions to problems that arise from nonpecu-
niary externalities within the WTO will depend on the circumstances.
Negotiations in the WTO
Should nonmarket access issues associated with labor and environmental standards be
negotiated in the WTO? Put differently, should agreements on labor and environmental stan-
dards be negotiated in the WTO to address problems that arise as a result of nonpecuniary
externalities associated with unilateral standards choices?
In principle, a case can be made for combining these issues in a single negotiating forum,
if it enhances the negotiating parties' flexibility in dividing the gains created by their negoti-
ations.2 For example, suppose country A pollutes a stream that flows across the border into
country B. A negotiation between the governments of countries A and B that focused too
narrowly on water standards might fail, if as a consequence the government of country B
had nothing to offer country A in return for A's tighter pollution controls. If, on the other
hand, country B could offer country A a market access concession in return for A's tighter
standards, then negotiations might result in an efficient resolution of the problem.
The key question is, Does country B need to be able to offer country A a WTO binding to
induce the government of country A to raise its water pollution standards to an efficient
level? There are two reasons why the answer to this question may be no.
First, the notion that market access concessions are the only thing of value that govern-
ments can offer in negotiations seems overly restrictive. For example, the 1980s witnessed
international "debt for environment" swaps between the developed and the developing
countries, and more generally most developed countries give direct financial aid to many
developing countries and often tie this aid to certain conditions. Hence, the ability to find
alternatives to market access concessions when dividing the gains from international negoti-
ations among the parties to them seems fairly widespread.
Second, even if one country wishes to offer market access to another in return for strength-
ening the other's standards, there is no particular reason why this offer must take the form
of a WTO binding. For example, the government could offer to set its applied (most-favored-
nation) tariff below the bound rate in exchange for tighter standards abroad. Such a bargain
"' IGNATIus HORSThLNN,JAMES R. MARKUSEN, &JACKRoBLEs, MULTI-ISSUE BARGAINING AND LINKED AGENDAS:
RICARDO REVISITED ORNO PAIN NO GAIN (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8347, 2001).
2 Giancarlo Spagnolo, Issue Linkage, Delegation, and International Policy Cooperation (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Stockholm School of Economics).
21 HORSTMANN, MARKUSEN, & ROBLES, supra note 19.
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does not require WTO involvement. Alternatively, in exchange for one country's promise
to strengthen its standards, its trading partners might indicate willingness to engage in fu-
ture market access negotiations in the WTO on products important to that country's exporters.
In a bargain that took this form, there again would be no explicit link between standards
levels and WTO bindings, and no need for the WTO to be involved in such a bargain.
If we focus on the most currently relevant case, that of developed countries seeking to
raise labor and environmental standards in developing countries, an additional possibility
is introduced by the Enabling Clause and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
This option enables a developed country to condition the promise of additional preferential
market access on the standards of the developing country.22
What exactly are the Enabling Clause and the GSP? In a 1971 decision, the GAiT Con-
tracting Parties agreed that "the provisions of Article I shall be waived for a period of ten
years to the extent necessary to permit developed contracting parties... to accord prefer-
ential tariff treatment to products originating in developing countries... without according
such treatment to like products of other contracting parties."23
Subsequently, in 1979, the GATT Contracting Parties decided that" [n] otwithstanding the
provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may accord differential
and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment
to other contracting parties."24
This decision, known as the Enabling Clause, allows developed nations that are members
of the GATT to apply" [pireferential tariff treatment... to products originating in develop-
ing countries in accordance with the Generalized System of Preferences. "25
National GSP lists are not always transparent: the identity of enlisted developing nations
and the extent of commitments depend largely on political considerations. Arguably, the
consistency of some national GSP lists with the principle of nondiscrimination is subject to
question. Developing countries, however, have refrained from challenging national GSP
schemes that could arguably contravene the letter and spirit of the Enabling Clause, because
in most instances they have little incentive to do so; they would rather be on good terms
with GSP donors and profit from the eventual extension of a GSP to them.
Recently, Brazil threatened legal action for the first time with respect to practices of the
European Community (EC) that allegedlywere inconsistent with the Enabling Clause. Had
Brazil persisted, this would have been a WTO adjudicating body's first opportunity to dwell
on these issues. Brazil's request for consultations with the European Community, though,
'was not followed by a request for the establishment of a panel.26 Since there has been no
notification of a solution reached by the parties, one can only speculate as to what actually
persuaded Brazil to discontinue its original request.
Thejusticiability of GSP-related concerns aside, the new generation of GSP lists does link
preferences to labor standards. For example, the European Community's GSP list28 contains
'Asimilar possibility is to condition membership in free trade agreements or customs unions on the strength
of standards (along the lines of the recently negotiated U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement). A potential risk
should be noted, though: if governments see preferential arrangements as the only feasible way to address stan-
dards concerns, then the result may be a proliferation of tariff discrimination, with the possibility of associated
damage to the WTO system.
' Generalized System of Preferences, June 25, 1971, GAIT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24, 25 (1972).2
" Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,
Nov. 28, 1979, i. (26th Supp.) at 203, 203 (1980) (citation omitted).
2' Id. (citation omitted).
2 6 SeEuropean Communities-Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, Request for Consultations by Brazil, WTO
Doc. WT/DS209/1 (Oct 19, 2000).
-
7Which should have been given in accordance with Article 3.6 of the DSU, supra note 13.
National GSP lists are available online at the Web site of the UNCTAD, <http:wvw.unctad.org>.
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special incentive arrangements that operate on the basis of an additional preferential margin,
which is granted to beneficiary countries that complywith certain requirements related only
to labor standards and environmental protection. The labor standards whose adherence the
European Community compensates are those reflected in ILO Conventions Nos. 87,98, and
138;29 that is, those on the right to organize and bargain collectively and child labor. The
United States imposes similar conditions for accession to its GSP list.
30
In practice, the institutional arrangementjust described can operate either when a new
round is being negotiated or later. In the first scenario, at the end of the negotiations devel-
oped nations could offer additional market access opportunities to developing countries in
exchange for strengthened labor or environmental standards. Conversely, developed nations
could make a precommitment that they would add developing nations willing to raise their
labor standards at any time to their GSPs.
An advantage of a GSP-based approach is its flexibility. A disadvantage is the lack of legal
security: GSP beneficiaries can enter and leave GSP lists without any motivation. The effec-
tiveness of this approach will depend on the willingness of donor countries to take their GSP
commitments seriously.
In sum, if these or other approaches are feasible, so that one country does not need to
offer another country a WTO binding to induce that country to tighten its standards, then
agreements on labor and environmental standards need not be negotiated in the WTO to
address problems that arise as a result of nonpecuniary externalities associated with uni-
lateral standards choices. A GSP-based approach is, of course, nonbinding in nature, hence
hardly enforceable. It does, however, provide parties interested in high labor standards with
an incentive-compatible structure, since they will in fact be compensating WTO members
willing to conform to their standards.
Enforcement in the WTO
Should agreements on labor and environmental standards negotiated outside the WTO
to address problems that arise as a result of nonpecuniary externalities associated with uni-
lateral standards choices be enforced by means of WTO dispute settlement procedures?
Would it be wise for the WTO to utilize its scarce enforcement power to prevent race-to-the-
bottom/regulatory-chill problems from occurring?
The problem of enforcement of WTO commitments can be boiled down to the task of
holding each country's market access commitments to a manageable level, so that no country
has an incentive to break those commitments. 32 In principle, it is therefore never a good
idea for the WrO to focus on some ways that countries could break their market access com-
mitments (e.g., by a unilateral increase in tariffs) to the exclusion of others (e.g., by a uni-
lateral weakening of a labor or environmental standard).
' ILO Convention (No. 87) Concerning the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 9, 1948, 68
UNTS 17; ILO Convention (No. 98) ConcerningFreedom ofAssociation and Protection of the Right to Organize,
July , 1949, 96 UNTS 257; ILO Convention (No. 138) Concerning MinimumAge forAdmission to Employment,
June 26, 1973, 1015 UNTS 297.
' 19 U.S.C. §§2461-2467 (1994).
s If this lack of legal security is determined to be an impediment to the use of GSP for this purpose, it might
be possible to enhance the legal security of GSP commitments by allowing each developed country to record a
list of criteria for GSP benefits in its Article II schedule.
-2 For an economic perspective on enforcement in trade agreements, see BAGWELL & STAIGER, GATT-THINK,
supra note 1; Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, A Theory ofManaged Trade, 80 AM. ECON. REv. 779 (1990); Avinash
Dixit, Strategic Aspects of Trade Polity, in ADvANcES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: FIFrH WORLD CONGRESS 329 (Truman F.
Bewley ed., 1987); Giovanni Maggi, The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89 AM.
ECON. REv. 190 (1999).
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Economic theory points to circumstances in which explicit linkage between theXWTO and,
say, the ILO, for enforcement purposes-wherebyviolation of ILO commitments would trig-
ger retaliatory trade measures authorized by the WTO (and possibly vice versa)-may be
beneficial, and also circumstances in which such linkage provides no benefits or might even
be harmful."3 Explicit linkage of this kind could simply lead to a reallocation of enforcement
power across WTO and ILO agreements, in which case the effectiveness of the enforcement
of WTO commitments might be diminished so as to enhance enforcement of ILO commit-
ments. Alternatively, explicit linkage could lead to the creation of additional enforcement
power that, in principle, could enhance the performance of each agreement. The outcome
depends in part on whether these issues are viewed by governments as complements or sub-
stitutes.3 In short, the impacts of explicit linkage will depend on the circumstances.
Even with no linkage between the 'WTO and international labor organizations, however,
countries can theoretically still threaten denial of market access as a means of enforcing
commitments on labor standards negotiated in other international forums. For example,
a developed country could threaten to revoke the GSP privileges it extends to a developing
country if that country does not abide by the labor and environmental commitments negoti-
ated between the two countries. Such a threat would not require WTO involvement. Alter-
natively, a developed country could threaten to raise to its bound level a tariff that had been
applied below that level, if a developing country with which it had negotiated labor and
environmental commitments does not abide by them. Again, no WTO involvement would
be required.
Moreover, some linkage between the WTO and international labor and environmental
organizations can occur even without the creation of any explicit links between the WrO
and these organizations, and this "implicit" linkage in principle can always enhance the
performance of each organization. Like the explicit linkage described above, the implicit
linkage we are referring to involves the possibility that the WTO will authorize trade mea-
sures in the circumstance of, say, violation of an ILO commitment. But unlike explicit link-
age, where the retaliatory trade measures would represent the use of new retaliation rights
under augmented WTO rules, the trade measures under such implicit linkage would simply
represent an exercise of already existing nonviolation nullification-or-impairment or renego-
tiation rights in the WTO.
Consider, for example, a country that has ratified an ILO convention and must therefore
ensure that its labor policies are in line with this convention in order to conform with its
ILO obligations. Suppose now that this country binds its tariffs in WTO negotiations. If this
country subsequently violates its ILO commitments by nonapplication of the ratified ILO
convention, and if this nonapplication has market access implications-e.g., by reducing
access to the country's markets from the level that its tradingpartners could have reasonably
anticipated in light of its bound tariffs andiLO-conforminglabor policies-then in principle
its trading partners would have a right of redress under the DSU and GATT provisions on
nonviolation nullification and impairment. Under this right of redress, either the country
would have to find a way to restore the original level of market access, or else its trading
partners could be authorized under WTO rules to seek compensation for the nullification
3 Recent papers on the topic of linkage and trade agreements include Paola Conconi & Carlo Perroni, Issue
Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations, 4J. INT'L ECON. (forthcoming) ;Josh Ederington, International
Coordination of Trade andlDomesticPolicies, 91 Azi. ECON. REv. 1580 (2001);Josh Ederington, Global Environmental
Agreements and Trade Sanctions (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript); Nuno Umio, Trade Policy, Cross-Border
Externalities and Lobbies: Do Linked Agreements Enforce More Cooperative Outcomes? (2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with Department of Economics, Columbia University); Spagnolo, supra note 20.
34 See text at note 20 supra.
2002]
THE AMERICANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
or impairment of their market access rights (which could include reciprocal withdrawals of
market access, i.e., tariff increases that affect this county's exports). The key point is that
ratification of ILO commitments can create "reasonable expectations" for trading partners
that a country will apply these conventions, and nonapplication of these conventions may
then subject the country to the possibility of nonviolation complaints in the WTO.
While we have described a role for the WTO Agreements' nonviolation nullification-or-
impairment provisions in helping to enforce ILO commitments, the renegotiation provi-
sions of the WTO can play a similar role in principle.' In both instances, the point is the
same: existing market access rights in the WTO mightbe used to help enforce commitments
to labor standards negotiated in the ILO, if violation of ILO commitments would imply
important market access consequences and thus set the stage for a nonviolation complaint
within the WTO or trigger WTO renegotiations.
In this general way, "implicit" linkages between WTO and ILO commitments-implicit
since a violation of an ILO commitment would not be considered a violation of WTO commit-
ments-can play a useful role in contributing to the enforcement of ILO commitments. The
same would apply to commitments negotiated in any other international labor or environ-
mental organization. And, at the same time, the legitimate exercise of these links may be
an important component of enforcing WTO commitments and maintaining the balance
between rights and obligations for WTO member governments.
Proposal
The possibility of gainfully combining market access and nonmarket access issues in a
single negotiating forum depends in part on the instruments available to the parties for
distributing the gains created by their negotiations. And the possibility of gainfully linking
distinct issues for enforcement purposes depends in part on whether these issues are comple-
ments or substitutes in the objectives of governments.
In short, whether or not it is advisable to negotiate and/or enforce solutions to problems
that arise from nonpecuniary externalities within the WTO depends on the circumstances.
The only exception seems to be with regard to implicit enforcement links between the WTO
and labor and environmental agreements negotiated elsewhere. These implicit enforcement
links represent an exercise of already existing nonviolation nullification-or-impairment or
renegotiation rights in the WTO, and the legitimate exercise of these links can be an impor-
tant component ofenforcingWTO commitments and maintaining the balance between rights
and obligations for WTO member governments.
These considerations suggest the following proposal with regard to the role of the WTO
in addressing nonpecuniary externalities associated with labor and environmental standards:
(1) as a general matter, agreements on labor and environmental standards should not
be negotiated in the WTO to address problems that arise as a result of nonpecuniary ex-
ternalities associated with unilateral standards choices; and
(2) as a general matter, explicit links between the WTO and other international labor
and environmental organizations should not be established for enforcement purposes,
but the existing implicit enforcement links between the WTO and other organizations-as
embodied in the nonviolation nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions
of the WTO Agreements-should be encouraged.
The WTO Agreements' renegotiation provisions might come into play if a country's nonconformity with its
ILO obligations were responsible for enhanced export volumes that its trading partners did not wish to accept.
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IV. THE NEED TO MICROMANAGE DIVERGENT PUBLIC ORDERS
The W IO confronts a complex set of questions associated with labor and environmental
standards. We argue above, however, that progress can be made if the market access issues
associated with these questions are separated from the nonmarket access issues. We identify
race-to-the-bottom and regulatory-chill concerns as market access issues, we suggest that the
WTO should address these concerns, and we describe ways that WTO principles and proce-
dures might be augmented to do so. As for nonmarket access issues, we argue that as a gen-
eral matter these are best handled outside the WTO, and that, while implicit links of the
kind we describe above might be encouraged, explicit links between the WTO and other
labor and environmental organizations should generally not be forged. We view these pro-
posals as a measured approach to labor and the environment within the WTO.
Our approach is largely dictated by the uncertainty over linkages between trade and labor
(or environmental, or any other public order) standards that permeates WTO law. Whether
a WTO member can legitimately adopt laws that ban sales of goods produced according to
unfair (in the mind of the regulating WTO member) labor standards is far from clear. Ulti-
mately in the GATT context, the answer to this question will depend on the interpretation
of "like products" and/or the term "public morals." With respect to the first term, we ob-
serve that the aforementioned recent Asbestosjurisprudence added only confusion to the
preexisting discussion: as the report stands, whether or not protectionist intent matters for
two products to be alike is difficult to state. If it does matter, it will be almost impossible to
enact a law banning sales of products produced with unfair labor standards. If it does not,
the opposite is probably true. By the same token, if the discussion shifts to the realm of
GATT Article XX (assuming that protectionist intent is simply immaterial for the purposes
of defining likeness), one would have to find a way to bring such laws under the ambit of
the "public morals" exception. Steve Charnovit 36 has argued that this is indeed the case, but
so far there is no WTO case law accepting this point of view.
A broad interpretation of the moral exception can open the door to a war betveen public
orders: what is the WTO positive-law response, for example, to a complaint against a hypo-
thetical EC law banning all imports from the United States as long as the latter continues
to impose the death penalty, a sanction that does not correspond to the EC public order?
This example might sound far-fetched, but there is already ample evidence that, on a
smaller scale, some WTO members do link trade to conformity with their (not necessarily
trade-related) public order: namely, the EC and U.S. GSP lists that we mentioned above; the
United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, which contains references to labor standards;
and a recent Belgian standard concerning labeling of products made in accordance with fair
(to Belgian minds) labor standards.
These examples are the first indications of a growing need to micromanage regulatory
diversity. Theoretically, micromanagement could be either self-policed or imposed in an
exogenous manner. We do not believe that the first option is realistic; the current system
of remedies 7 in the WTO legal order gives more of an incentive to the greater players to
impose their own public order (and, in fact, they have started doing so, albeit on a small
scale so far, as the GSP lists, the Belgian standard, and the U.S.-Jordan Agreement men-
tioned above show).
An exogenous solution seems more appropriate. Such a solution could be legislative (though
involving substantial costs) or simply the outcome of the interpretation of the existingWTO
"Steve Charnovitz, The MoralException in TradePolity, 38 VA.J. INT'LL. 689 (1998).
On this issue, see Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the TO Legal System:Between a Rock andaHard Place, 11 EUR.
J. INT'LL. 763 (2000).
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contract. Our proposal contains elements of both approaches but strongly favors judicial
activity; by limiting linkages issues to addressing pecuniary externalities alone, the WTO
dispute settlement system would stick to the idea of protecting market access and not be
transformed into a court of general jurisdiction.
Our approach is probably consonant with the public international law concept of extra-
territoriality. Amazingly, there has never been a discussion of this issue in WTO case law,
although it has arisen on several occasions (the Tuna/Dolphin disputes probably being the
most notorious). A WTO member wishing to request foreigners to respect its public order
must demonstrate that it can legitimately legislate on the issue at hand. If an activity occurs
beyond its frontiers but affects thatWTO member, it will have to invoke the effects doctrine.
The effects doctrine, at least in its version in the U.S. and EC legal orders, requests that the
affected jurisdiction show substantial, foreseeable, and direct effects on the market. Even
if the first two elements can be shown, the third criterion will be quite difficult to satisfy
whenever a WTO member wishes to address a nonpecuniary externality.
